Carrying out analyses performed on the provisions of “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws”, which is described as the religious provisions introduced by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad is one of the questions of debate in Shafiī Sect. The reason laying out of this controversy is based on the question, whether the provisions enunciated via the prophets before the Prophet Muhammad are recognized within the legal aspect, or not. On the other hand, there is no controversy between the procedural, on non-binding for Muslims, (...) about of the previous divine communiqués, which are not mentioned in the Qur’ānor the sunnah, and previous divine messages with evidence that they were abolished despite their presence in these two sources. In the same way, there is no debate about the fact that the provisions of the previous divine religions that were in force for Muslims, such as fasting, also remained in force for Muslims. In this case, with taking part in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, the provisions that there is no evidence about whether they abolished or not, it is debated that they are for Muslims binding or not.In this study, our objective is to carry out analyses and researches on the methodological conceptions of Imam Shafiī and Shafiī lawmen with regards to Pre-Islamic Divine Laws, which have no evidence for being retained in force or being abolished for Muslims despite being mentioned in the Qur’ān or the sunnah, as well as on the level of theoretical conceptions of these scribes being put into practice within the scope of fiqh examples.SummaryIt is a must to identify the scope of Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā) [shariah of those before us], which is discussed in terms of being recognized as a shariah evidence by the Shafiī lawmen before analzying the opinions of Shafiī Sect followers. Yet, setting forth the opinions in a healthy manner is based on the identification of the question of debate. Within this context, it is a must to draw up the lines and borders in what the Shafiī lawmen / lawyer and canonists / judiciary mean by the term “Pre-Islamic Divine Laws (Sharia Man Qablanā)” in order to designate the practical results of methodological discussions on Pre-Islamic Divine Laws.Sharia Man Qablanā, of which lexical meaning is “shariah of those before us” is defined in fiqh as follows: “These are the religious provisions acquainted by the prophets before Prophet Muhammad”. In fact, this definition can be categorized as “general” in terms of the evidential value of Sharia Man Qablanā. In that, since it is not possible to carry out an analysis on the reliability of the informational value in the previous divine notices, which cannot be conferred neither in the Holy Qur’ān and the sunnah, each and every lawmen and canonists, including those recognizing Sharia Man Qablanā as hujjat (proof), have come to an agreement that the early divine notices that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān and sunnah will not be recognized in terms of its informational value for Muslims, thus being besides the mark to discuss its validity and bindingness. In this case, the outlines of Sharia Man Qablanā, as controversial in terms of its hujjat value, must be specified. Belonging the earlier divine religions as per the works of lawmen, Sharia Man Qablanā is subjected to a categorization of four part with regard to provisions mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, whether they are recognized as hujjat by Muslims. 1. The provisions that are not mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah, yet being mentioned only in the earlier monotheistic revelations. The fiqh lawmen have come to an agreement that these provisions are not binding for Muslims, and even that it is not permissible to act in accordance with these provisions. Because, there is no certain information on whether these provisions are reliable.2. The earlier divine notices, which have been proven to be nullified for Muslims, despite being mentioned in the Holy Qur’ān or the sunnah. Since these divine notices have lost their validity, there is a consensus among Muslims that they are not recognized as hujjat. The following hadith is shown as an example as of from the sunnah for this part “Pillage was not halal to those before me, but not it is halal to me” (Muslim, “Masājid”, 56). In that, this hadith indicates that prohibition with regards to the pillage, which was not permissible to the earlier ummahs (nations), is not recognized by Muslims. Thus, rendering pillage as not halal cannot be attributed to Muslims. 3. The provisions of earlier divine religions, which remained in force about Muslims. The canonists exemplify this matter with “fasting”. It can be understood from the verse “O ye who believe! Fasting is prescribed to you as it was prescribed to those before you, that ye may (learn) self-restraint.” (al-Baqara 2/183) that the fasting was a provision as prescribed for the earlier ummahs, which remained in force for Muslims as well. There is no controversy on the matter that fasting is prescribed for Muslims too, as it can be clearly seen from the verse. The hadith of the Prophet Muhammad “It (sacrificing an animal for God) is the sunnah from your Ancestor Ibrahim” (Ibn Majah, “Adāhi”, 3) can be shown as an example that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims as well. As a matter of fact, this hadith attests that sacrificing an animal for god is applicable to Muslims, as it is in the religion of the Prophet Ibrahim. 4. The provisions from earlier divine religions, which have no evidence whether they were revoked or remaimed in force for Muslims. The canonists cannot find any evidence for the provisions with regards to the alternative utilization of something between the partners to be recognized as applicable for Muslims within the scope of the following verses: “Here is a she-camel: she has a right of watering, and ye have a right of watering, (severally) on a day appointed” (al-Shu‘ara 26/155) and “And tell them that the water is to be divided between them: Each one's right to drink being brought forward (by suitable turns)” (al-Qamar 54/28). Similarly, there is no evidence that the provisions concerning the retailation, as prescribed in Torah, whether they remained in force or were revoked, as it can be seen in the verse “We ordained therein for them: "Life for life, eye for eye, nose or nose, ear for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal” (al-Ma’ida 5/45). (shrink)

Kur’an-ı Kerim indirildiği günden bugüne hem muhtevası hem de üslubuyla gerek inananların gerekse inanmayanların hep ilgisini çekmiştir. Bu ilgi zamanla onun başka dillere tercümesini beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu tercüme faaliyetleri aynı şekilde hem Müslümanlar hem de Gayr-i Müslimler tarafından yapılmıştır. Kur’an-ı Kerim’in kendine has ve tarih boyunca benzerinin getirilemediği eşsiz bir üslubu vardır. Onun üslubunun eşsiz olması aynı zamanda başka dillere tercümesini de zorlaştırmaktadır. Ancak Kur’an hitabının tüm insanlara yönelik olması onun başka dillere tercümesini de zorunlu kılmıştır. Bugüne kadar farklı dillere (...) yapılmış Kur’an tercümelerinin sayısı yüzü aşmıştır. Bu tercümelerin her birinin Kur’an’ı doğru anlamaya katkı sunmak iddiası, tercümelerde takip edilen yöntemi de belirlemiştir. Bu yöntemlerden en çok tercih edileni hiç kuşkusuz anlamın tercümesi yöntemidir. Bu yöntemin yanı sıra harfi harfine tercüme de başvurulan yöntemlerden bir tanesidir. Merhum Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Fransızca’ya yaptığı Le Saint Coran adlı tercüme bir Müslüman âlim tarafından yapılmış ilk harfi harfine tercüme örneğidir. Muhammed Hamidullah’ın Doğu ve Batıyı bilen ve çok çeşitli alanlara hâkim bir ilim adamı olması yaptığı bu tercümeyi dikkate değer kılmıştır. Bunun yanı sıra daha başka özellikleri ile de dikkat çeken bu Fransızca çeviri Aziz Kur’an: Çeviri ve Açıklama şeklinde Türkçeye tercüme edilmiştir. Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de hatırı sayılır derecede bir okuyucu kitlesine sahip olan Hamidullah’ın, Türkçeye aktarılmış bu tercümesi değerlendirilecektir. (shrink)

İslam hukuk doktrininde bir fiilin veya sözün hükmünü belirleme noktasında kasıt esas alınır. Kasıt; hukuki işlemlerden elde edilmek istenen neticedir. Bununla birlikte mükellefin söz veya fiillerinin kasıt sonucu meydana gelmesi halinde söz ve fiillerine hüküm bağlanır. Bu takdirde bir akdin esasını onunla elde edilmek istenen hukuki neticeye yöneltilmiş olan tarafların kastı teşkil eder. İslam dini mükelleflerden bir davranışı ortaya koyduğu zaman bunun bilinçli olarak yapılmasını ve o işe kalben yönelmesini istemiştir. Dini emir ve yasakların tamamı bir maksadı gerçekleştirmek için vazedilmiştir. (...) Şari’in emir ve yasaklardaki maksadı da ya kulların maslahatını temin etmek yada onlardan bir mefsedeti gidermektir. Mükelleften istenen de bu maksat doğrultusunda hareket etmesi ve Şari’in maksadından başka bir şeyi kastetmemesidir. Hukuki tasarrufların geçerli olması noktasında bütün mezheplerin kasta önem verdikleri görülmektedir. (shrink)

Are there practical reasons for and against belief? For example, do the practical benefits to oneself or others of holding a certain belief count in favor of that belief? I argue "No." My argument involves considering how practical reasons for belief, if there were such things, would combine with other reasons for belief in order to determine all-things-considered verdicts, especially in cases involving equally balanced reasons of either a practical or an epistemic sort.

Suppose we grant that evolutionary forces have had a profound effect on the contours of our normative judgments and intuitions. Can we conclude anything from this about the correct metaethical theory? I argue that, for the most part, we cannot. Focusing my attention on Sharon Street’s justly famous argument that the evolutionary origins of our normative judgments and intuitions cause insuperable epistemological difficulties for a metaethical view she calls "normative realism," I argue that there are two largely independent lines of (...) argument in Street’s work which need to be teased apart. The first of these involves a genuine appeal to evolutionary considerations, but it can fairly easily be met by her opponents. The second line of argument is more troubling; it raises a significant problem, one of the most difficult in all of philosophy, namely how to justify our reliance on our most basic cognitive faculties without relying on those same faculties in a question-begging manner. However, evolutionary considerations add little to this old problem, and rejecting normative realism is not a way to solve it. (shrink)

It has been claimed that the recent wave of neuroscientific research into the physiological underpinnings of our moral intuitions has normative implications. In particular, it has been claimed that this research discredits our deontological intuitions about cases, without discrediting our consequentialist intuitions about cases. In this paper I demur. I argue that such attempts to extract normative conclusions from neuroscientific research face a fundamental dilemma: either they focus on the emotional or evolved nature of the psychological processes underlying deontological intuitions, (...) in which case the arguments rely on a blatantly fallacious inference, or they appeal to the (alleged) moral irrelevance of the factors to which deontological intuitions respond, in which case the neuroscientific results end up playing no role in the overall argument. (shrink)

The linchpin of Williamson (2000)'s radically externalist epistemological program is an argument for the claim that no non-trivial condition is luminous—that no non-trivial condition is such that whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains. I argue that Williamson's anti-luminosity argument succeeds only if one assumes that, even in the limit of ideal reflection, the obtaining of the condition in question and one's beliefs about that condition can be radically disjoint from one another. However, no (...) self-respecting defender of the luminosity of the mental would ever make such an assumption. Thus Williamson can only secure his controversial claims in epistemology by taking for granted certain equally controversial claims in the philosophy of mind. What emerges is that the best bet for defending an internalist epistemology against Williamson's attack is to take there to be a tight, intimate connection between (to take one example) our experiences and our beliefs upon reflection about the obtaining of those experiences, or between (to take another example) the rationality of our beliefs and our beliefs upon reflection about the rationality of those beliefs. (shrink)

Quasi-realists aim to account for many of the trappings of metanormative realism within an expressivist framework. Chief among these is the realist way of responding to the Euthyphro dilemma: quasi-realists want to join realists in being able to say, "It’s not the case that kicking dogs is wrong because we disapprove of it. Rather, we disapprove of kicking dogs because it’s wrong." However, the standard quasi-realist way of explaining what we are up to when we assert the first of these (...) two sentences rests on a mistaken identification of metaphysical dependence (or grounding) with counterfactual covariation. This chapter proposes a better way for expressivists to understand such sentences, on which they serve to express complex states of mind in which an attitude bears a relation of psychological dependence (or basing) to another state of mind. It is argued that this proposal is a natural, versatile, and fruitful approach for expressivists to take that helps them secure the first half of the Euthyphro contrast—but at the cost of making it difficult to see how expressivists can make sense of that contrast’s second half. (shrink)

I argue—contra moderate grounding pluralists such as Kit Fine and more extreme grounding pluralists such as Jessica Wilson—that there is fundamentally only one grounding/in-virtue-of relation. I also argue that this single relation is indispensable for normative theorizing—that we can’t make sense of, for example, the debate over consequentialism without it. It follows from what I argue that there is no metaethically-pure normative ethics.

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose some transfor mations based on the centroid points between single valued neutrosophic numbers. We introduce these trans formations according to truth, indeterminacy and falsity value of single valued neutrosophic numbers. We propose a new similarity measure based on falsity value between single valued neutrosophic sets. Then we prove some properties on new similarity measure based on falsity value between falsity value between single valued neutrosophic sets. Furthermore, we propose similarity measure based on falsity value between (...) single valued neutrosophic sets based on the centroid points of transformed single valued neutrosophic numbers. We also apply the proposed similarity measure between single valued neutrosophic sets to deal with pattern recognition problems. (shrink)

A quasi-sequel to "Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions." Covers some of the same ground, but also extends the basic argument in an important way.

Moral properties are explained by other properties. And moral principles tell us about moral properties. How are these two ideas related? In particular, is the truth of a given moral principle part of what explains why a given action has a given moral property? I argue “No.” If moral principles are merely concerned with the extension of moral properties across all possible worlds, then they cannot be partial explainers of facts about the instantiation of those properties, since in general necessitation (...) does not suffice for explanation. And if moral principles are themselves about what explains the moral properties under their purview, then by their own lights they are not needed in order to explain those moral properties’ instantiation—unless, that is, the principles exhibit an objectionable form of metaphysical circularity. So moral principles cannot explain why individual actions have moral properties. Nor, I also argue, can they explain why certain other factors explain why those actions have the moral properties that they do, or in some other way govern or mediate such first-order explanations of particular moral facts. When it comes to the explanation of an individual action’s specific moral features, moral principles are explanatorily idle. (shrink)

Mehmet Karabela draws upon Carl Schmitt’s analysis more explicitly to interrogate and understand how Islamic and Western scholars have conceptualized an “apolitical” Islam that could then be politicized. He applies Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction as characteristic of the political to the study of Islam and shows how Islam has always been political and religious at the same time in this context. Liberalism posits a separate realm of religion and politics that it charges Islam and other political religions wrongly mix, but (...) there is no intrinsic separation of politics from religion in a post-secular context, and we have many lessons to learn of and from Islam. Rather than the modern nation-state, which is the locus for Schmitt, the polity of Islam is more situated on the Muslim community, which is less determinate and defined. Every community, particularly every religious community, is potentially political in the Schmittian context. (shrink)

In this study, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s views on knowing Allah (ma‘rifatullah) and following issues have been analysed. In this context, either the divine message has reached to a person or not, it is examined whether ma‘rifatullah is obligatory (wajib) upon him. Subsequently, it is discussed whether this obligation is ensured by reasoning (‘aql) or revelation (naql). Furthermore, while keeping in mind the role of intellect (nazar) and argumentation (istidlāl), we have established and evaluated religious state and source of nazar and (...) istidlāl. Also, we discussed to what extend God can be the subject of knowledge and from which aspects He can be known. Besides, we discussed whether ma‘rifatullah is an obligation and if not what its justification is. In addition, we examined whether imitative knowledge (taqlīd) is possible in the case of ma‘rifatullah or not and whether it’s sufficient to know God just by taqlīd without the reasoning at all. Finally, Qāḍī Abd al-Jābbār’s opinions on the religious situation of people to whom the divine revelation did not reach at all and so they lack of knowledge on God. (shrink)

The question of whether Islamic philosophy can be considered as an authentic form of philosophy has been a subject of prolonged discourse. Various perspectives have emerged, presenting three distinct approaches to this matter. The first approach, primarily advocated by orientalists, contends that Islamic philosophy lacks authenticity. Contrarily, the second viewpoint asserts that while Islamic philosophy exhibits eclecticism, it represents a form of creative eclecticism. Finally, the third perspective posits that Islamic philosophy is unequivocally authentic, affirming its rightful place within the (...) realm of philosophical discourse. Regrettably, Islamic philosophy, despite its profound significance during the Middle Ages, has not received the recognition it truly deserves within the pages of philosophical history books. Authors have often allocated only brief sections to this rich philosophical tradition, overlooking its depth and influence. It is frequently emphasized that Islamic philosophy serves as a continuation of Greek philosophy, acting as a vital bridge that connects the realms of Ancient Greek philosophy and medieval Western philosophy. Orientalists regarded Muslim philosophers as mere interpreters of Ancient Greek philosophers, ignoring their philosophical authenticity. Recent studies have revealed that this prejudiced approach of the orientalists is fallacious. Medieval Islamic philosophy, which reached its golden age during the 9th-13th centuries, began to be rediscovered. Islamic philosophy introduced completely novel themes with Sufism and theology, and, developed fresh and innovative perspectives by integrating Greek philosophy. In particular, unique insights and movements have been put forward on subjects such as Ghazalism, Illuminationism, Eastern philosophy, occasionalism, methodical skepticism, the theory of creation ex nihilo, prophecy, the relationship between philosophy and religion, and critical analysis of the ideas put forth by ancient philosophers. While the Western world underwent a “dark age” during The Middle Ages; the Islamic world experienced a remarkable and intellectually vibrant “philosophical” movement. The movement, which can be called the “Miracle of the Muslims”, holds significant prominence within universal culture, in terms of both being an inseparable part of Islamic civilization and a crucial milestone in the development of Western philosophy. (shrink)

Johannes Steuchius’ disputatio uses Arabic logic to present an historical account of the development of philosophical thought in Arabia before and after the emergence of Islam. Steuchius first proposes that philosophy drew its origins from the East. His evidence for this claim is that many of the Greek philosophers, considered the forefathers of European philosophy, began cultivating their philosophical thinking as a result of exposure to ancient Eastern philosophy. After the introduction of Greek philosophy, it is agreed that dialectic was (...) among the first of the arts the Arabs practiced. (shrink)

Once upon a time, coherentism was the dominant response to the regress problem in epistemology, but in recent decades the view has fallen into disrepute: now almost everyone is a foundationalist (with a few infinitists sprinkled here and there). In this paper, I sketch a new way of thinking about coherentism, and show how it avoids many of the problems often thought fatal for the view, including the isolation objection, worries over circularity, and concerns that the concept of coherence is (...) too vague or metaphorical for serious theoretical use. The key to my approach is to take a familiar tool from discussions of the regress problem -- namely, directed graphs depicting the support relations between beliefs -- and to use that tool in a more sophisticated manner than it is standardly employed. (shrink)

Moral particularists argue that because reasons for action are irreducibly context-dependent, the traditional quest in ethics for true and exceptionless moral principles is hopelessly misguided. In making this claim, particularists assume a general framework according to which reasons are the ground floor normative units undergirding all other normative properties and relations. They then argue that there is no cashing out in finite terms either (i) when a given non-normative feature gives rise to a reason for or against action, or (ii) (...) how the reasons that are present in a given context play off each other to determine one’s overall duties. However, the conjunction of these two theses leaves particularists without a coherent notion of a reason for action: posit too much irreducible context-dependence in the behavior of reasons, and the reasons-based framework breaks down. One upshot is that the particularists’ challenge to principle-based approaches to ethics has not, at present, been successfully made out; another upshot is that perhaps the best way to formulate that challenge involves renouncing the reasons-based framework all together. (shrink)

One of the important aspects of the classical kalām is that the philosophical topics related to physics and cosmology, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, have an important place in it. The reason for the involvement of the kalām scholars (mutakallimūn) in these kinds of issues is commonly regarded as an effort to defend Islamic beliefs against other religions and thought systems. However, when their studies are examined closely, the complexity of their concepts and theories, as well as the fact that (...) they discussed these matters not only with opposing groups but also among themselves, show that kalām had a much deeper and integrated relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. Their engagement with philosophical and scientific matters, such body (jism), substance/atom (jawhar), accident (ʿaraḍ), motion, space, time, and causality dates back to the mid-8th century and displays great diversity. Although the mutakallimūn probably were the first ones to deal with physics-related issues in Islamic thought, it cannot be said that they are given the importance they deserve in modern studies pertaining to the history of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. The fact that, in kalām works, physics-related questions were generally discussed along with theological matters has caused the scholarship of mutakallimūn to be regarded as an adjunct of apologetic discipline and has thereby led to a limited description of kalām’s relationship with science and philosophy in the classical period. This set of circumstances hinders a proper understanding of how science and philosophy emerged and evolved in Islamic thought. In the present article, I will attempt to present the place and role of physical topics, namely daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām, in classical kalām, between the 9th and 11th centuries. Firstly, I will show how the classical mutakallimūn divided kalām into two parts, namely ‘major’ (jalīl) matters, which are based on revelation, and ‘subtle’ (daqīq) or ‘obscure’ (laṭīf) matters, which mainly depend on reason. Matters surrounding jalīl al-kalām indicate the theological problems on which the mutakallimūn had a general agreement, such as God’s oneness, revelation, prophethood, and eschatology. Questions discussed under the category of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām mostly correspond to philosophical and scientific issues concerning epistemology, physics, and cosmology. Secondly, I will examine to what extent the mutakallimūn dealt with physical sciences and what kind of topics were primarily discussed in the field of daqīq or laṭīf al-kalām. The upshot of this will be that the claim that the mutakallimūn were interested in physics and cosmology merely for apologetic purposes is unsound; rather, in the 9th and 10th centuries, many Muslim theologians also concerned themselves with issues such as motion, void, body, and causality as truth seekers. That being the case, the mutakallimūn should be taken into consideration in studies related to the emergence and rise of science and philosophy in Islamic thought. (shrink)

BackgroundIn terms of ethical decision making, every clinical case, when seen as an ethical problem, may be analyzed by means of four topics: medical indications, patient preferences, quality of life, contextual features. The aim of this study was to compare the performance of 4th year dental students on Ethical Decision Making before and after a course on ethics.MethodsFourth year dental students from academic year 2013–2014 participated in the study. A 3-h lecture, which was about four topics approach to clinical ethical (...) case analysis, was given to the students. The lecture was based on case scenarios related with dental ethics. After the completion of lectures,a case scenario was presented to the students to assess their ethical decision making abilities. At the end of the exam, four topics and ethical judgment were evaluated. Their performances on this examination were evaluated before and after lectures. Statistical evaluation was performed with the significance level set at p 0.05). The mean total score of the students after the course was significantly higher than before course.ConclusionMore lectures should be implemented to the curriculum to increase the student awareness of ethical issues and to reach the ultimate goals of dental education. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Rigveda’da tasvir edildiği şekliyle Vedik ritüeller bağlamında rahiplerin dini ve sosyo-ekonomik rollerini incelemektedir. Seçilen ilahilerin nitel tematik analizi yoluyla araştırma, Soma kurbanının karmaşık prosedürlerini, rahiplerin çeşitli sınıflandırmalarını ve ritüelistik çerçevedeki benzersiz işlevlerini vurgulamaktadır. Rahipler için bir ücretlendirme biçimi olan ‘daksina’ kavramı, Vedik toplumun sosyal dokusunu ve ruhani ekonomisini korumadaki önemini tanımlamak için analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma ayrıca, bu ritüellerin metafizik açıdan algılanan etkinliğini araştırmakta ve kurbanların edimsel yönleri ile yağmur gibi çevresel olgular arasında doğrudan bir bağlantı olduğunu öne sürmektedir. (...) Metin analizini bilimsel yorumlarla çapraz referanslandıran bu araştırma, Vedik dönemin dünya görüşünü şekillendiren kurban uygulamalarının maddi refah ve manevi liyakat elde etme aracı olarak anlaşılmasını sağlamaktadır. Bulgular, rahipler ve toplum arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkinin yanı sıra Vedik ritüellerin antik Hindistan’daki kültürel ethos ve dini bakış açısı üzerindeki kalıcı etkisine ışık tutmaktadır. (shrink)

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman’s reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction (...) on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungMenschen mit türkischem Migrationshintergrund zählen zu einer der größten Bevölkerungsgruppen mit Migrationshintergrund in Deutschland. Im Vergleich zu Menschen ohne Migrationshintergrund leiden sie im Durchschnitt häufiger an einigen chronischen Erkrankungen, was teilweise auf ihren durchschnittlich niedrigeren sozioökonomischen Status zurückzuführen ist. Im Gesundheitssystem begegnen sie zudem unterschiedlichen Zugangs- und Wirksamkeitsbarrieren, da ihre Bedarfe und Erwartungen von Versorgungseinrichtungen oft nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt werden. Eine solche nicht nutzerorientierte Versorgung chronisch kranker Menschen kann der erfolgreichen Behandlung bzw. Krankheitsbewältigung im Weg stehen. Die Berücksichtigung von subjektiven (...) Krankheitsvorstellungen ist notwendiger Bestandteil einer nutzerorientierten Gesundheitsversorgung. Sie muss dabei sowohl die Sensibilisierung des Personals für die Krankheitsvorstellungen seiner Patientinnen und Patienten, als auch die gezielte Förderung von Krankheitsvorstellungen auf Seiten von Patientinnen und Patienten umfassen, die sich positiv auf die Krankheitsbewältigung auswirken. Gleichzeitig müssen Patientinnen und Patienten befähigt werden, sich kritisch mit eigenen Krankheitsvorstellungen auseinanderzusetzen, wenn diese eine erfolgreiche Krankheitsbewältigung behindern. Als Strategien kommen hierfür zum Beispiel Interventionen wie Storytelling in Frage, die auf dem Austausch von Wissen und Erfahrungen basieren. (shrink)

Guilt and fear today have developed an unexpected quality: they contribute powerfully to the survival of humanity. The feeling of guilt proceeds from an elementary awareness: although the unequaled progress of science and technology in the twentieth century has undoubtedly ameliorated the conditions of human life, it also has given rise to an infernal logic of genocide and crimes against humanity, in which almost all nations, directly or indirectly, have participated and participate still. This awareness is joined to another, which (...) is itself accompanied by a primordial fear: for the first time in history, science and technology have endowed humanity with the power to destroy itself and the planet, without furnishing humans with the means of escaping their destined role as sorcerer's apprentice, for no science can tell us what to do with science. It is this double feeling of guilt and fear that pushes contemporary man to search feverishly for ethical foundations capable of furnishing discreet regulatory principles to underpin decisions and actions. From the point of view of contemporary humanity, ethics must be able to confer meaning and perspective on an existence which apparently has neither: “Now,” writes Hans Jonas, “we shiver in the nakedness of nihilism in which near-omnipotence is paired with near-emptiness, greatest capacity with knowing least for what ends to use it.”. (shrink)

Ten years ago, an issue of the journal L'Homme et la Société was entitled “La Mode des identités.” Most of the articles were about cultural identity, but the basic thrust of the work was “a critique of the ‘fashion’ of identity calling into question the validity of a notion as striking as it is uncertain.” Recently, a special issue of the journal Sciences Humaines, entitled “Identité et identités,” dealt with personal, familial, social, professional identities and only spoke of cultural identity (...) marginally and in a roundabout way. Finally, in a manual of Sociologie politique published by the Presses Universitaires de France, the author takes to task the notion of ethnicity inherent to cultural identity and pushes the critique of the ethnic group to the point of negating its objective existence. Must we think then that the notion of cultural identity is henceforth obsolete, that it has lost all pertinence? (shrink)

This study aimed to examine the thoughts and expectations of patients receiving healthcare from their physicians and evaluate the ethical aspects of these thoughts and expectations. To determine the ethical aspects of the thoughts and expectations of patients, an open-ended question was asked on the web page of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) Health Care Command, which is accessible to the users of the TAF intranet system (the internet system used within TAF institutions). The participants were asked to express their (...) thoughts in their own words. A total of 804 participants answered the question by providing their input. The statements of the participants were classified separately by two public health specialists. The classification was made in accordance with the basic principles of patient rights, and they were collected under various headings including expectations about respect and care, good communication, informed consent, and fair and non-privileged distribution of healthcare services. The results show that patients tend to consider the physicians they see as solely responsible for all the negative issues that they encounter during their healthcare. This indicates that there is a need for extensive research on the underlying factors involved in the negative thoughts and feelings toward healthcare professionals in both TAF and Turkey in general. (shrink)

After summarizing the essential details of Anil Gupta’s account of perceptual justification in his book _Empiricism and Experience_, I argue for three claims: (1) Gupta’s proposal is closer to rationalism than advertised; (2) there is a major lacuna in Gupta’s account of how convergence in light of experience yields absolute entitlements to form beliefs; and (3) Gupta has not adequately explained how ordinary courses of experience can lead to convergence on a commonsense view of the world.

Intergenerational altruism is an important area of research to understand the impact of culture on economic outcomes. We hypothesize based on recent research about intergenerational altruism and tough love model that worldviews, religious beliefs, and people’s confidence about their worldviews affect intergenerational altruistic economic behaviour. We extend the research on the impact of worldviews on intergenerational altruism by focusing on Turkey. In the empirical analysis, we run probit regressions using data from a large national survey. We find that worldviews, religiosity, (...) and confidence of individuals about their worldviews impact on intergenerational altruistic economic behaviour in Turkey. (shrink)

The notion of dharma is one of the most important concepts of Hinduism. This paper deals with the semantics diversity of the term of dharma, which is a Sanskrit word derived from the root of dhṛ that means to support, hold, maintain. In addition, the concept of purushārtha, consisting of the words purusha and artha, is examined by focusing on the different usages of that term. It is criticized why purusarthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga and the historical and (...) philosophical significance of the purusarthas is discussed. Besides, the connection of purushārthas with varna and ashramas has been investigated as well as it is mentioned which purushārtha orders should be observed by caste members and which purushārtha should be considered by individuals in the ashrama system.Purushārtha is a key concept in Hinduism and refers to the three/ four proper goals or aims of a human life. The word purushārtha literally means purpose of human being or object of human pursuit. All four purushārthas are important, but in cases of conflict, dharma is considered more important than artha or kama in Hindu philosophy. Moksha is considered the ultimate ideal of human life. It is also criticized that purushārthas are defined as trivarga or çaturvarga; its historical and philosophical significance was discussed. In addition, the connection of purushārthas with varna (brahman, kshatriya, vaisya, sudra) and ashramas (brahmacharya, grihastha, vanaprastha, sanyasa) has been investigated. In the caste system, the knowledge of which purushārtha element that caste members should observe has been mentioned. It was emphasized which purushārtha should highlight in the stages. (shrink)

Both the continuity of the history of Ottoman thought with Islamic thought and its relationship with the "new" movements of thought that emerged in the Western world have not yet been analyzed on a solid ground. In particular, the connection that Ottoman scholars established or failed to establish with the developments in the Western has been handled with various biased and superficial evaluations. One of the critical points that will contribute to a meaningful discussion of this issue is the translation (...) and commentary of Ioannes Cottunius' partial commentary and partial summarization of Aristotle's Physics into Arabic under the title al-Taʿlīm al-s̱ālis̱ by Asʿad al-Yānyawī as a member of the translation committee that established in the Tulip Period. In this study I will share some observations on why this work on Aristotle's physics was chosen for translation at a time when the new understanding of physics was thought to have become widespread in Europe, and whether the translation contains a new interpretation beyond a mere transmission. These determinations, which also include the criticism of some readings in the modern literature, will be largely based on the introduction (muqaddima) of the manuscript. (shrink)

Hristiyan teolog William Lane Crag'a ait din ve bilim arasındaki ilişkiyi ele lan bir çeviri...